

CE OF THE DD/1

File

25X1A

DATE: 11.1.71

to: Messrs. Proctor/Walsh

FROM:

25X1A

SUBJECT: Security Leaks Mechanism

REMARKS:

Following Walter Pforzheimer's suggestion, Security drafted a proposed procedure for handling a centralized data base on leaks of intelligence information. [redacted] has now signed off.

25X1A

You will note each Deputy Director is charged with getting appropriate material to Security. This suggests we need some sort of machinery within the Directorate, as not all leaks fall exclusively in OSR's domain. Heretofore [redacted] has been sending to [redacted] all morning briefing notes on leaks.

25X1A

[redacted] wants to be kept informed on this operation. I would propose we circulate copies of the [redacted] memo to each office head at our next Executive Council session asking that each of them be responsible for monitoring leaks in their area. They should then forward

25X1A

to [redacted] the information required in paragraph (2) of [redacted] article memo.

25X1A

[redacted] will make sure that you are informed and then pass the material to [redacted] who in turn will give it to Osborn.

Does this sound practical?

A  
C  
T  
I  
O  
N

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>DD/S</i>	1 NOV 1971	<i>[initials]</i>
2	<i>DD/Sec</i>	11/2	<i>[initials]</i>
3			
4	<i>CFES</i>	3 NOV 1971	<i>[initials]</i>
5	<i>CFEPD</i>		
6	<i>DD/EPD</i>		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p><i>Copies sent to DD's +</i>  <i>Staff Chiefs</i></p> <p><i>11/4/71 - SSC will be conferring</i>  <i>with SACED &amp; set the wheels</i>  <i>in motion.</i></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Executive Officer <i>[redacted]</i>			1 NOV 1971
UNCLASSIFIED			SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

25X1A

25X1A

TRANSMITTAL SLIP			1 Nov 71
TO: D/Security			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
FROM:			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

20 OCT 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Support  
Deputy Director for Plans  
Deputy Director for Science and Technology  
General Counsel  
Inspector General  
Legislative Counsel  
Director of National Estimates  
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence  
Programs Evaluation  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs  
Director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

SUBJECT : Leaks of Intelligence Information to the Public  
Information Media

1. The Director of Security has been made responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a centralized data base covering leaks of intelligence information to public information media. Data will be cross referenced in such a manner as to provide for rapid identification for retrieval and analysis.

2. To assist the Director of Security in carrying out the above responsibilities, each Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office or his designee will forward to the Office of Security at least the following information:

a. A copy of both the offending news media article and the compromised document. In cases where the compromised item is contained in a bound volume like the CIB, a copy of the item and the identity of the volume where it is located will suffice.

b. An appropriate title (subject matter) for the leak, i. e., USSR, China, Israel, Arab, Vietnam, weapons, missiles, submarines, aircraft, etc., or a combination of these, if appropriate.

c. An indication of the gravity of the leak, i. e., serious, moderate or slight.


d. If known, the distribution of the compromised item.

e. Where appropriate, a follow-up report containing a damage assessment.

SECRET

f. Recommendation for further action (or nonaction)  
based on indications of source, gravity, damage, etc.

3. Where leaks occur involving compartmented information, reports should be forwarded to the Director of Security following the appropriate codeword routing procedures. Appropriate controls will be established by the Director of Security to process and store such data.



25X1A

Acting Executive Director-Comptroller

cc: Assistant to the DCI  
Director of Security



25X1A

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED				CONFIDENTIAL				SECRET			
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP											
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS						DATE		INITIALS		
1	C/EPD						9/30		D		
2	DD/PS						9/30		hu		
3	C/ES						9/30		ATH.		
4	D/Security						30 SEP 1971		2/10		
5	DD/Security						10/15/71		ESD		
6	DC/EPD (via Sue 3E-29)						5 OCT 1971		if		
ACTION				DIRECT REPLY				PREPARE REPLY			
APPROVAL				DISPATCH				RECOMMENDATION			
COMMENT				FILE				RETURN			
CONCURRENCE				INFORMATION				SIGNATURE			
Remarks:											
This paper has been coordinated with											
1. The Special Security Center 2. C/SSU/DDP and his replacement 3. Sec Off/DDI 4. C/SMS/DDS&T 5. C/SR&CD											
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER											
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.								DATE			
[REDACTED], DC/EPD											
UNCLASSIFIED				CONFIDENTIAL				SECRET			

25X1A

FORM NO.  
1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

4 OCT 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Leaks of Intelligence Information  
to the Public Information Media

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; such recommendation is contained in paragraph 7.

2. In a memorandum dated 20 August 1971, Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, recommended that a centralized data base for leaks of intelligence information to the public information media be established in the Office of Security. He made this recommendation because, in his view, the Agency is poorly prepared to make a crash study of intelligence leaks against a tight deadline.

3. As you are aware, [REDACTED] and a proposed revision to [REDACTED] require that any employee having knowledge of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information must report it promptly to the Director of Security, who, in coordination with the appropriate Deputy Director or the Executive Director-Comptroller, will determine the steps to be taken to limit the extent of the damage and to identify the person responsible for the unauthorized disclosure. The proposal set forth herein would establish a centralized data base concerning unauthorized disclosures of intelligence to the public information media.

25X1A

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

4. The Office of Security is prepared to establish and maintain a centralized data base covering leaks of intelligence information to the public information media in the following manner:

a. Each Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office or his designee will forward to the Office of Security at least the following information:

- (1) A copy of both the offending news media article and the compromised document. In cases where the compromised item is contained in a bound volume like the CIB, a copy of the item and the identity of the volume where it is located will suffice.
- (2) An appropriate title (subject matter) for the leak, i.e., USSR, China, Israel, Arab, Vietnam, weapons, missiles, submarines, aircraft, etc., or a combination of these, if appropriate.
- (3) An indication of the gravity of the leak, i.e., serious, moderate or slight.
- (4) If known, the distribution of the compromised item.
- (5) Where appropriate, a follow-up report containing a damage assessment.

SECRET




- (6) Any information which might aid in identifying the individual who made the unauthorized disclosure.

5. Data submitted will be cross-referenced in such a manner as to provide rapid identification for retrieval and analysis purposes.

6. Those leaks which occur in the compartmented area should be maintained in the compartmented system while being transmitted to the Office of Security. We will, of course, establish necessary compartmented security controls to process and store such data.

7. It is recommended you approve the proposal set forth herein.

  
Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security

25X1A

SUBJECT: Leaks of Intelligence Information to the Public  
Information Media

CONCURRENCES:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Edward W. Proctor  
Deputy Director  
for Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Thomas H. Karamessines  
Deputy Director for Plans

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Carl E. Duckett  
Deputy Director  
for Science & Technology

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
John W. Coffey  
Deputy Director  
for Support

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

The recommendation contained in paragraph 7 is approved.

\_\_\_\_\_  
L. K. White  
Executive Director - Comptroller

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

SECRET

Dist/Director

Orig. - Return to CS

1 - Asst. to DCI

1 - Executive Director - Comptroller

1 - EE

1 - DDP

1 - DDI

1 - DDM

2 - DCS

1 - General Counsel

1 - C/SR&CD/OS - Xerox

1 - D/Security

① - EPD File Xerox

1 - EPD Chrono

1 - C/SSC - Xerox

25X1A OS/EPD [REDACTED] :jrs (28 September 1971)

20 Sept 71

PROPOSED OUTLINE FOR RESPONSE TO WHITE HOUSE REQUEST

- I. Introduction (reference to earlier study and present request)
- II. Methodology
  - A. USIB Security Committee (and predecessors, if necessary to get back to 1961-<sup>1963</sup>)
  - B. Functions and operating methods
  - C. ~~Nature~~ Nature of the files (data base)
- III. Findings
  - A. Number of matters (press leaks) called to SC attention (and newsmen involved in leaks)
  - B. Originator (initiator) of SC attention
  - C. Number of investigations, including initiators
  - D. Corrective or follow-up actions taken
  - E. The 1961-63 Period in Particular
- IV. Implications of the Findings

This outline is a suggestion only, but is responsive to the particular questions posed by the White House. The first two sections should be brief, and designed merely to tell the reader the context for the data presented. The third section (III) is the guts of the paper. I think the focus should be on the statistical findings, in table form if possible. The corrective actions (III.D) and 1961-63 period subsections will of necessity be narrative in form. Section IV is intended as a summary of the historical pattern, not an analysis of the problem or recommendations for change. Depending on the length of the paper, we may want to put a summary up front between I and II.

SA/CH/SR/PA 1830R

25X1A

At Annex would be selected materials from your files which summarize periods or trends.